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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-SEARcH AND SEIZURE-CURTILAGE IN-
CLUDES THE GARDEN. Sanders v. State, 264 Ark. 433, 572 S.W.2d 397
(1978).
State and local police officers searched the rural homeplace of
Jack Sanders in Sorghum Hollow, Arkansas, and found fourteen
hundred marijuana plants in his garden. Sanders' garden was lo-
cated 100 to 200 yards behind his trailer and could only be reached
through a gate in the fence that separated the trailer from the rest
of the yard. The garden contained a small sampling of other vegeta-
bles in addition to the marijuana. Although the trial court found the
search warrant to be invalid, it held that the search of Sanders'
garden was not a violation of his fourth amendment rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures. On Sanders' motion to sup-
press, the court ruled that the garden was not within the protected
area of the curtilage, making the fruits of the search (the marijuana)
admissible in evidence against Sanders.
Sanders was convicted of the manufacture of a controlled sub-
stance and sentenced to ten years in the Department of Correc-
tions.' On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas held that the
motion to suppress should have been granted because the garden
should not have been searched without a valid search warrant.
Sanders' conviction was reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Sanders v. State, 264 Ark. 433, 572 S.W.2d 397 (1978).
The term "houses" as protected by the fourth amendment has
historically been interpreted to include the surrounding area of the
house, known in the common law as the curtilage.2 Derived from the
Old French "cortillage," and from the Latin "cohors," which mean
a "place enclosed around a yard,"3 the term includes that area
surrounding the house that is considered "home."' Curtilage has
been defined as "a space, necessary and convenient and habitually
used for the family purposes, and the carrying on of domestic em-
ployments. It includes the garden, if there be one, and it need not
be separated from other lands by fence." 5 Accordingly, there must
be a home in order to have a curtilage. The curtilage includes that
1. Sanders v. State, 264 Ark. 433, 572 S.W.2d 397 (1978).
2. Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22 (10th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932 (1956).
3. United States v. Romano, 388 F. Supp. 101, 104 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
4. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIEs *225.
5. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 460 (4th ed. 1968), citing Fugate v. Commonwealth, 294 Ky.
410, 171 S.W.2d 1020 (1943) and Bare v. Commonwealth, 122 Va. 783, 94 S.E. 168 (1917).
125
UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 3:125
area used for the daily activities of the family, such as the garage,'
the back yard,7 the garden, 8 the barn,' the smokehouse, 0 and the
ground surrounding the dwelling." The curtilage has been said to
be protected from governmental intrusion as completely as the in-
side of the dwelling house."
Whether an area is within the curtilage often turns upon the
facts as a whole. Courts have developed certain factors to be used
as guides in defining the limits of the curtilage. These factors in-
clude whether the area is near the dwelling house, 13 whether the area
is within the residential yard,' whether the area is within the same
fence surrounding the house, 5 and whether the area is occupied for
family purposes. 6 Because the scope of the curtilage cannot be pre-
cisely defined, inconsistency has resulted among the courts on what
is within the curtilage. 7
The curtilage is sometimes demarcated by an adjacent open
field. The well-known open field exception to the requirement of a
search warrant arose in 1924 with the decision by the United States
Supreme Court in Hester v. United States.8 In Hester, revenue
6. Temperani v. United States, 299 F. 365 (9th Cir. 1924).
7. Fixel v. Wainwright, 492 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1974).
8. Childers v. Commonwealth, 198 Ky. 848, 250 S.W. 106 (1923).
9. Rosencranz v. United States, 356 F.2d 310 (1st Cir. 1966).
10. United States v. Mullin, 329 F.2d 295 (4th Cir. 1964).
11. Boyance v. Myers, 398 F.2d 896 (3d Cir. 1968).
12. Durham v. State, 251 Ark. 164, 471 S.W.2d 527 (1971). The Supreme Court of the
United States has held that a search warrant is required unless the search is incidental to a
lawful arrest, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), or unless exigent circumstances are
present, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). The primary means of enforcing the fourth
amendment is the exclusionary rule as applied to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961). The rule deters illegal searches and seizures by prohibiting the use in court of all
illegally seized evidence.
13. Wyss v. State, 262 Ark. 502, 558 S.W.2d 141 (1977).
14. Durham v. State, 251 Ark. 164, 471 S.W.2d 527 (1971).
15. Patler v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 448, 177 S.E.2d 618 (1970), cert. denied, 407 U.S.
909 (1972).
16. Thomas v. United States, 154 F.2d 365 (10th Cir. 1946).
17. Although a garage used in connection with a residence was held to be within the
curtilage in Temperani v. United States, 299 F. 365 (9th Cir. 1924), an abandoned dwelling
house was found not to be within the curtilage in United States v. Thomas, 216 F. Supp. 942
(N.D. Cal. 1963). While the court in Welch v. State, 154 Tenn. 60, 289 S.W. 510 (1926), found
a hog lot 300 yards from a residence to be within the curtilage, another court has found an
unoccupied house 300 yards from a residence not within the curtilage. Robie v. State, 117
Tex. Crim. 283, 36 S.W.2d 175 (1931). And although a barn on a small farm was found within
the curtilage in Rosencranz v. United States, 356 F.2d 310 (1st Cir. 1966), a goose house 400
feet from a farmhouse has been held not to be within the curtilage. Saiken v. Bensinger, 546
F.2d 1292 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 930 (1977).
18. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
NOTES
officers without a search warrant concealed themselves on Hester's
father's land and watched Hester hand a bottle to another man.
When Hester and his companion realized that they were being
watched, Hester picked up a jug, and the two men ran across a field,
dropping both the jug and the bottle. The officers picked up the jug
and the bottle, the contents of which were subsequently found to be
illegally distilled whiskey. In upholding Hester's conviction, the
Supreme Court found the land upon which the officers stood while
watching Hester to be an open field and not within the curtilage
surrounding the house; hence, the lack of a search warrant was not
fatal to the introduction in court of the evidence seized by the offi-
cers. 19
This open field doctrine has served as a definite example of
what is not within the curtilage. When an area is found to be an
open field, no search warrant is required. Like the guidelines em-
ployed to find an area within the curtilage, the absence or presence
of a dwelling, 0 the distance from the home, 21 and the presence or
lack of a fence22 usually are considered when determining if a partic-
ular area is in fact an "open field," and thus not within the pro-
tected area.
In Katz v. United States,2 3 the United States Supreme Court
changed its focus from protected physical areas to the protection of
the privacy of the individual. Katz was indicted for transmitting
wagering information from Los Angeles to Miami and Boston via
calls made from a public phone booth. The Government was permit-
ted to introduce recordings of Katz's conversations overheard by
FBI agents who had placed an electronic listening device on the
outside wall of the phone booth. The trial court based its admission
19. Mr. Justice Holmes succinctly stated the opinion of the Court:
The only shadow of a ground for bringing up the case is drawn from the hypothesis
that the examination of the vessels took place upon Hester's father's land. As to
that, it is enough to say that, apart from the justification, the special protection
accorded by the Fourth Amendment to the people in their "persons, houses, papers,
and effects" is not extended to the open field. The distinction between the latter
and the house is as old as the common law.
Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
20. Ford v. State, 264 Ark. 141, 569 S.W.2d 105 (1978), where a partially enclosed field
in a rural area was found to be an open field.
21. Wyss v. State, 262 Ark. 502, 558 S.W.2d 141 (1977), where a wooded area one mile
away from the home of the accused was held to be an open field.
22. Patler v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 448, 177 S.E.2d 618 (1970), cert. denied, 407 U.S.
909 (1972).
23. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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of such evidence upon Olmstead v. United States,24 which had held
that any recording obtained without a physical trespass did not
violate the fourth amendment.15 Katz was convicted, and the Court
of Appeals affirmed his conviction.2 On appeal, the United States
Supreme Court abandoned the physical trespass test adopted by the
lower courts. Instead of focusing upon whether a phone booth is a
constitutionally protected area and whether penetration of that area
is necessary to find a violation of the fourth amendment, the Court
stated that the proper approach is to ask whether the individual has
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched and not
whether the area is physically protected by the fourth amendment.
Finding the interception of Katz's conversations without a search
warrant to be a violation of the fourth amendment, the Supreme
Court reversed Katz's conviction.Y
In Sanders v. State,2 the Arkansas Supreme Court continued
to rely on a standard analogous to the physical trespass test and
reviewed Arkansas cases wherein the open fields doctrine was ap-
plied to uphold convictions based upon evidence seized without
24. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
25. In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), where the "trespass doctrine"
was established, Mr. Justice Brandeis dissented: "If the Government becomes a law-breaker,
it breeds contempt for law; it invites anarchy." Id. at 485.
26. Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130 (9th Cir. 1966).
27. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). The Court discussed the reasons
for a privacy-oriented approach to fourth amendment issues:
It is true that the absence of such penetration was at one time thought to foreclose
further Fourth Amendment inquiry. .... for that Amendment was thought to limit
only searches and seizures of tangible property. But "[tihe premise that property
interests control the right of the Government to search and seize has been discred-
ited" .. . .Once this much is acknowledged, and once it is recognized that the
Fourth Amendment protects people-and not simply "areas"-against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures, it becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment
cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given
enclosure.
Id. at 352-53.
28. The Supreme Court found Katz to have entertained a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his calls made from the phone booth:
[A] person in a telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the Fourth
Amendment. One who occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that
permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters
into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world.
Id. at 352. Because Katz had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his phone calls, a search
warrant was necessary to intercept his calls. The Court held that Katz' conviction could not
stand because the interception of his phone calls was effected without going through the
procedural safeguard of obtaining a search warrant. Id. at 359.
29. 264 Ark. 433, 572 S.W.2d 397 (1978).
NOTES
valid search warrants. 30 The court held that the area searched by the
police in the Sanders case was a garden and not an open field, and
therefore within the protection of the fourth amendment.3 The deci-
sion rested upon the finding that the area searched was a garden and
thus by definition within the curtilage.3 1 It was therefore protected
against warrantless searches; any evidence seized within the area
without a valid search warrant should have been suppressed.rs
Although the court rested its decision in Sanders upon the fact
that the area searched was a garden and was therefore within the
area protected by the fourth amendment, the court did not discuss
the factors ordinarily used to determine whether an area is within
the protection of the fourth amendment. At hand were the
judicially-developed criteria used for many years: the proximity of
the garden to the trailer," the lack of enclosure of the garden,3 the
use of the garden for family purposes, 3 and the location of the
garden outside the residential yard.37 As Justice Byrd discussed in
his dissenting opinion, it would seem that the area was more in the
nature of an open field when viewed in the light of past decisions.r3
Justice Byrd stated that two of the factors listed above should form
the basis for a finding that the area searched was not within the
protection of the fourth amendment. First, the garden was sepa-
rated by a fence from the residential yard, and the garden itself was
not enclosed.39 Second, the unusually high ratio of the number of
30. Id. at 436, 572 S.W.2d at 398.
31. Id. at 437, 572 S.W.2d at 399.
32. The court in Sanders attached some significance to the fact that the police officers
originally believed that a valid search warrant was necessary to search Sanders' garden. Id.
33. The Arkansas Supreme Court summarily advanced the basis of the decision:
The State's argument that this was an open field search is inconsistent with
the action of the officers and the physical facts in this case. First, they did not
attempt to conduct an open field search. They attempted to search Sanders' prem-
ises pursuant to a warrant that was later declared invalid. The first witness called
by the state called it a garden-not an open field.
Essentially, the State is using the open field argument as a crutch to shore up
an otherwise illegal search. The officers were right the first time-a warrant was
needed because the plot was Sanders' garden, next to his dwelling.
Id.
34. Wyss v. State, 262 Ark. 502, 558 S.W.2d 141 (1977).
35. Patler v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 448, 177 S.E.2d 618 (1970), cert. denied, 407 U.S.
909 (1972).
36. Thomas v. United States, 154 F.2d 365 (10th Cir. 1946).
37. Durham v. State, 251 Ark. 164, 471 S.W.2d 527 (1971).
38. Sanders v. State, 264 Ark. 433, 439, 572 S.W.2d 397, 400 (1978) (Byrd, J., dissent-
ing).
39. Id. at 439, 572 S.W.2d at 399.
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marijuana plants to the number of vegetables indicated that the
area searched was not used for family purposes; hence, it was not a
garden."'
The court did not consider Sanders' reasonable expectation of
privacy in the garden. Since the Katz decision in 1967,"1 the United
States Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have used the
privacy interest as the focus of search and seizure issues. The deter-
mination of a person's expectations of privacy about an area is made
after examining the individual's efforts to keep the area private and
the nature of the area itself."2 This new emphasis upon privacy has
signalled an end to the carving out of specific ground areas as within
the scope of fourth amendment protection. 3 Although the Hester
decision has not been expressly overruled, the Supreme Court has
since Katz consistently adhered to the reasonable expectation of
privacy standard when deciding search and seizure cases." This
40. Justice Byrd pointed out that "to call the one row of corn and the few vegetables
here grown among the ten rows of marijuana anywhere from 200 to 300 feet in length a garden
bastardizes the plain meaning of the term garden ... " Id. at 439, 572 S.W.2d at 400. Justice
Byrd also stated: "Whether the appellant was raising the 1400 marijuana plants here (a
pickup truck load) for family purposes or for commercial purposes was certainly a fact issue
for the trial court . I.." Id
41. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
42. In United States v. Hitchcock, 467 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 916 (1973), the court found that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his jail cell because it was under official surveillance and shared none of the
attributes of a home.
43. The Katz decision has been repeatedly cited as establishing a new approach to the
protection of the fourth amendment. As the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated in
United States v. Fluker, 543 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1976), "The 'curtilage' test is no longer
appropriate in ascertaining the extent of the Fourth Amendment's protections against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures." Id. at 716. In United States v. Hitchcock, 467 F.2d 1107
(9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 916 (1973), the court stated, "[tihe protection of the
Fourth Amendment no longer depends upon 'constitutionally protected' places." Id. at 1108.
A good discussion of the old curtilage test and the new privacy standard appears in Watten-
burg v. United States, 388 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1968):
[Ilt seems to us a more appropriate test in determining if a search and seizure
adjacent to a house is constitutionally forbidden is whether it constitutes an intru-
sion upon what the resident seeks to preserve as private even in an area which,
although adjacent to his home, is accessible to the public. . . .As the Supreme
Court said in Katz, "The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."
The "curtilage" test is predicated upon a common law concept which has no
historical relevancy to the Fourth Amendment guaranty. ...
If the determination of such questions is made to turn upon the degree of
privacy a resident is seeking to preserve as shown by the facts of the particular case,
rather than upon a resort to the ancient concept of curtilage, attention will be more
effectively focused on the basic interest which the Fourth Amendment was designed
to protect.
Id. at 857-58.
44. Recent decisions wherein the Supreme Court relied upon the reasonable expecta-
NOTES
adherence was verified by the Court in Smith v. Maryland, 5 where
Justice Blackmun stated: "Consistently with Katz, this Court uni-
formly has held that the application of the Fourth Amendment
depends on whether the person invoking its protection can claim a
'justifiable,' a 'reasonable,' or a 'legitimate expectation of privacy'
that has been invaded by government action."'
The Arkansas Supreme Court has decided several cases dealing
with the open field doctrine since 1967, yet in none of them has the
court expressly employed the privacy standard set forth in Katz. 7
In view of the focus upon the expectations of privacy of the individ-
ual set forth and consistently followed by the United States Su-
preme Court and followed by the state and lower federal courts since
1967, a reliance upon the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy
standard in addition to, if not in place of, the common law curtilage
doctrine would more comprehensively protect the interests of those
claiming fourth amendment violations. A careful consideration of
an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy in the area
searched is a necessary ingredient of an effective fourth amendment
claim in light of the Supreme Court's admonition in Katz that the
"Fourth Amendment protects people-and not simply 'areas' and
that "the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence
or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.""
Kathryn Duncan Holt
tions of privacy standard are Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); United States v. Chad-
wick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); United States v.
Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973); Mancusi v. DeForte,
392 U.S. 364 (1968); and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
45. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
46. Id. at 740.
47. In Durham v. State, 251 Ark. 164, 471 S.W.2d 527 (1971), evidence found in an open
field was suppressed where the entry was gained from the curtilage (wherein evidence ob-
tained led the officers to the open field). In Bedell v. State, 257 Ark. 895, 521 S.W.2d 200
(1975), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 (1977), evidence obtained in a search of a 306 acre tract of
partially cleared land was held to have been properly admitted in court. A wooded area one
mile away from the home of the accused was held to be an open field in Wyss v. State, 262
Ark. 502, 558 S.W.2d 141 (1977). In Ford v. State, 264 Ark. 141, 569 S.W.2d 105 (1978), a
partially enclosed field in a rural area was found to be an open field.
48. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
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